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Introduction
Darnell discusses the “asymmetrical access to power” between na-
tive Americans and white Americans within the context of interethnic
communications (61). This retention of power over a subordinate group
constrains interaction and creates a feeling of uneasiness which, in turn,
further reinforces the unequal status between the two groups. Darnell
goes on to elaborate that political , legal and educational institutions
were at the forefront of validating this “power differential” (61). Though
the identification of potential obstacles in communication specifically re-
fers to the above−mentioned contact group, similar observations can cer-
tainly pertain to almost any interethnic situation in which a dominant
party exerts power over a subordinate party. American history has left a
number of institutional fingerprints testifying to the enactment of Eng-
lish language policies. Here is a partial list to name just a few:
1. In a response to the growing number of German Catholic schools,
the 1889 Edwards Law of Illinois and the Bennett Law of Wisconsin
required elementary schools to instruct children in English. Though
this law was later repealed it was clear that state government’s po-
sition was to show no tolerance for language use other than English
(Wiley 218).
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2. From 1913 to 1923, the number of states which required English
as the language of instruction in public and private schools in-
creased from 17 to 34. “In 15 of those states the imposition of Eng-
lish―only policies was explicitly linked to restrictions on other lan-
guages” (Wiley 228−9).
3. The policies to Americanize immigrants during the period be-
tween 1914 and 1924 by the state and federal government empha-
sized the use of English and American civic values for all the
United States (Ricento 90).
4. The United States introduced English instruction to the Philip-
pines at the turn of the 20th century (Phillipson 152).
5. In 1906, on the island of Guam, English was imposed for legal
and governmental purposes while the indigenous language ,
Chamorro, was prohibited in school in 1922 (Phillipson 153).
Whether such policies produced the desirable linguistic results con-
tinues to be debated, however, its long term effect on the attitudes and
values of not only those subjected but those who exerted their influence
over them, continues to cast its shadow even today. More likely, the en-
forcement of “Americanization” policies on ethnic parties was more suc-
cessful in stigmatizing cultural and linguistic diversity than in facilitat-
ing assimilation. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, it had succeeded in
contributing to intergenerational conflict in many ethnic families by
weakening respect for the language and culture of parents in the eyes of
children who were less than fully assimilated (Wiley 231 quoted in Mon-
talto).
This paper attempts to show that this attitude of power and domi-
nance was clearly exploited at the Tule Lake Relocation Center for the
Japanese Nikkei during World War II. After establishing the context for
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the tense atmosphere at the internment camp and investigating a series
of critical events surrounding the arrest and confinement of Nikkei in-
ternees, I will examine the cause of their arrest, which may provide
clues why those incarcerated were deemed to pose such a threat. I will
conclude that the institutional treatment of internees after this incident
had negative ramifications which brought on further suffering.
Pearl Harbor
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese in Hawaii, particu-
larly the Japanese−born Issei, were suddenly thrust into the spotlight of
suspicion. Rumors spread that those who were involved in the attack
were among the island’s Japanese residents. Reluctant to speak their
native tongue for fear of misunderstanding and even backlash, they re-
placed their family names and first names with American names ,
burned prized photographs from their homeland, and essentially kept a
low profile away from the glaring spotlight of public attention. A Nikkei
spokesperson for the “Speak American” campaign, exhorting the Japa-
nese who comprised nearly one −third of the population of Hawaii’s
Japanese to speak English, rationalized it in this way:
“In time of war, many things associated with the enemy are a
source of irritation and suspicion. Japanese, being the language of
our enemy, is especially irritating to many people. Used in the pres-
ence of others who cannot understand it, it also leads to suspicion”
(Yoshida 330).
From then on, whenever they spoke Japanese, which was never in
public, they whispered (Brown 113). Residents were subjected to strict
rules concerning telephone calls. They learned that all telephone conver-
sations would be censored and thus were restricted to English only
(Brown 84).
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The Japanese−speaking community including those residing in the
continental United States, were conscious that, due to their salient ap-
pearance and mannerisms among a predominantly white public, they
would have to force themselves to speak in English no matter how awk-
ward it was. When they arrived at the assembly centers, where over
100,000 Nikkei evacuees were held, the mandate to discourage the use
of Japanese speech in meetings, cultural events and religious services
further accentuated the subordinate status of the Japanese Nikkei (Fu-
jioka 217−219).
At the ten relocation centers scattered around the western and mid
−western United States after evacuees had been detained for months in
assembly centers on the West Coast , the War Relocation Authority
(WRA), National Director Dillon Meyer had already assigned project di-
rectors to facilitate the governing of Nikkei evacuees. Each director was
given latitude in terms of setting up policies; however, Tule Lake Relo-
cation Center, the largest of the WRA−run centers, became synonymous
with peoples’ suffering from the hands of a misdirected administration.
Relocation Center
Tule Lake Relocation Center opened its gates to the evacuees on
May 27, 1942 (U. S. Department of the Interior ix). Having to acclimate
in conditions even more sparse than those at the assembly center, Tule
Lake residents struggled to establish an existence while being forced to
dwell among those who held to divergent political and national loyalties.
Intending to release and resettle internees more expeditiously, the WRA
officials conceived a plan for the registration of Japanese American men
in the military and those not eligible for military duty― i. e., female Ni-
sei and both male and female Issei―to apply for permission to leave
camp called “Leave Clearance”. The registration procedure for Leave
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Clearance consisted of filling out a general questionnaire which included
two controversial questions which focused on the respondent’s loyalty to
America and/ or Japan.
At Tule Lake, the registration process never got started partly due
to a combination of factors including lack of time to deliberate over key
issues of the questionnaire, resignations of key leaders, distrust of the
current camp administration, exasperation over further bureaucratic red
tape and growing resistance as a result of their incarceration. The re-
sponse generated from registration was clearly antagonistic: evacuees
requested repatriation and expatriation to Japan, young males chose not
to register, leading to their arrests, and pressure groups formed to influ-
ence registrants’ decisions (Spicer, Hansen, Luomala, Opler 154−155).
Among the ten internment camps, despite holding the largest capacity
for internees, Tule Lake recruitment exhibited paltry results with only
fifty−one volunteering for military duty (Weglyn 146).
Segregation Camp
Later, the Tule Lake Relocation Center was chosen as the “deposit-
ing center” and eventual accommodation for “disloyal Japanese” and
thus inherited the dubious title of “Tule Lake Segregation Center”. Tule
Lake began housing evacuees relocated from other internment camps
and detention centers: those who either failed to respond or responded
negatively to the loyalty questions in the Leave Clearance questionnaire
or were family members of those respondents.
From the outset the center’s living conditions were deemed to be
worse off than those in any federal penitentiary (Weglyn 156). The large
influx of occupants to Tule Lake, was beyond the capacity the center
could normally accommodate , leaving many newcomers to live in
cramped or substandard quarters (Civil Liberties... 209). Housing com-
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plaints were received by the newly−appointed project director, Raymond
Best, who displayed an unsympathetic attitude towards the occupants
by his lack of regard to pressing needs including improved camp mainte-
nance, quality of food, particularly for infant care, health issues and
other community concerns.
While the number of military guards was substantially reduced in
other relocation centers, security in Tule Lake was increased, rendering
it essentially treated as a “prison camp” (Girdner, Loftis 298). Unlike
any of the existing internment centers, Tule Lake was equipped to meet
the standards of a maximum security segregation facility with fortified
fences, armed with a half−dozen tanks, and an increased number of bat-
tle−ready soldiers (tenBroek, Barnhart, Matson 163).
Adding to the Tule Lake residents’ frustrations were the diverse be-
liefs and ideologies of the new occupants. Tule Lake became the home to
the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei―though labeled as “disloyal”, many were seg-
regated from other internment centers for a number of different reasons.
Many had different agendas: some wanted to return to California (Tule
Lake was located in the northern tip of California); some desired to re-
patriate or expatriate to Japan; some felt their rights had been violated;
and then there were some who refused to relocate again to another
camp despite their allegiance to the U. S.; and still there were others
who wanted to keep their family unity intact despite loyalty differences
(Weglyn 158).
Protests
The appalling living conditions at Tule Lake and lack of work op-
portunities were key issues the internees wanted the administration to
address. A farm truck accident on October 15, 1943 which claimed one
casualty spurred the internees to suspend farm work in order to de-
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mand better working conditions; an organization named, Daihyo Sha
Kai (a pro−Japan organization ) , was established to represent them
(Thomas, Nishimoto 119). Further, they asked Project Director Ray-
mond Best’s permission to conduct funeral arrangements for their fallen
worker, only to be refused. The internees, among them farmers who had
to suspend their work, went forward with the funeral against the direc-
tor’s orders. A few days later, Best abruptly terminated the jobs of 800
farm workers for their part in the work stoppage.
When the National Director, Dillon Meyer visited the Tule Lake
center weeks later, on November 1, the Daihyo Sha Kai organized a
demonstration with thousands of supporters rallying for changes .
Though the rally was peaceful and orderly, the crowds had an intimidat-
ing effect on the center administration. Consequently, administration
staff members resigned, guard areas were fortified, regulations were
strictly enforced, and fences were strategically placed to protect the
staff. In an arrogant display of military force, the Army was ordered to
deploy “tanks, armored trucks, gas, and machine guns” to Tule Lake
and assumed control of the center after the Nov. 4 disturbance (Collins
43).
Camp administration staff
The behavior and attitude of the WRA camp administration staff to-
wards the internees at Tule Lake can best be described within the con-
text of the oppressive state of the segregation center. The mere fact that
the camp inhabitants were “segregees” or “disloyals” stirred up appre-
hension, and the vocal ones who were portrayed as “trouble−makers”
and “resistors” raised their fears, leading to an uneasy co−existence.
One member of the WRA staff told a newspaper reporter for the San
Francisco Chronicle,
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“There are petty misunderstandings out in the Jap colony that in
any normal community would be cleared up over night. But here
they grow and fester until we have a riot on our hands” (Girdner,
Loftis 317).
The Nov. 1 meeting between the internee representatives and the
national and project directors brought a crowd of over 5,000 internees
who surrounded the administration building, at which time the feeling
among the staff inside “was one of indecision, tension and fear often bor-
dering on hysteria” (Thomas, Nishimoto, 138−139). Convinced that mili-
tary protection was the only way to calm their fears, they sought assur-
ance from the military commander whose words apparently carried
stronger weight than the project director, Best. Displeased by his subor-
dinates for “going over his head”, Best terminated two of the staff mem-
bers (Okihiro 109).
To be fair, many of the internees themselves, especially those con-
cerned with the welfare of their children and other family members,
possessed similar fears towards the extremists in their midst. On the
other side of the administrative spectrum were employees whose feel-
ings toward the Japanese were belligerent and bordering on racist. One
staff member commented on the camp’s character:
“A considerable number of the administrative personnel . . . were
Southerners who were outspoken in their contempt of the internees
as members of a colored race ... A minority of the camp staff were
friendly to the evacuees and sought to help them as much as possi-
ble, but their friendliness merely caused further dissatisfaction and
strife because they were assailed as “Jap−lovers” by a majority of
the administrative staff” (Weglyn 215).
The reinforcement of the security facilities, including the building of
additional protection and a stockade, only added to the center’s prison−
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like atmosphere. Whether the fortified fences with added guardsmen
created a true or even ostensible sense of security among the adminis-
trative staff remained to be seen.
Critical Incident
The following incident , which occurred three days after Dillon
Meyer’s visit on Nov. 1, reflects the uneasy exchange between one group
of Caucasian staff and a young Nikkei worker in the wake of the mass
demonstration by internees. A teenage boy recounted what happened on
November 4th when troops and tanks mobilized to quell several violent
disturbances:
“On the night of Nov. 4, 1943, we were, as usual, in the Motor Pool
for we were working 3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. on that nightshift.
About 8:30 P.M., Mr. Jarrett, Mr. Zimmer, and a few other Cauca-
sians came in with requests for farm trucks ... when they presented
the requests, the signature of the Motor Pool head was missing, I
told them that we could not issue trucks without the proper papers
and signatures ... so I turned and asked my fellow workers in Japa-
nese what I should do. The head dispatcher came and took care of
the matter.
Nothing more happened until about 9:15 P.M. About that time, we
noticed a commotion outside and we saw the army coming in. Eve-
ryone thought it was nothing until the soldiers began to charge...
Without a word, we were taken into the Administration building
and lined up. We were forced to keep our hands above our heads
until they took us individually for questioning... Some of the fellows
we saw in there were bloody.
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When I was being questioned, Mr. Jarrett came up and said that I
was the one who spoke in Japanese and told them not to give him a
truck. After my questioning, we were taken to the hospital and kept
there under guard for four days. On November 8th, we were taken
into the Army Stockade. I was questioned a few times during my
stay there. On November 28th, I was released” (Weglyn 164).
Observations
At this juncture it might be useful to discuss the background of the
witness who provided the statement for the Nov. 4 incident.
First , though the authorities assumed he was older and thus
doubted the veracity of his age, (Weglyn 164) the young man was 16
years old. Aware of the administrative process, the young motor pool
evacuee reminded Mr. Jarrett and his men that proper steps had to be
followed before their request could be honored. Then, for confirmation,
he presumably asked his Japanese−speaking colleagues how the situ-
ation should be handled. There are a number of reasons why he might
have spoken in Japanese. He was perhaps most at ease speaking to
them in a language through which their working relationship at the mo-
tor pool had been forged. So, as a matter of respect, the teenager de-
ferred to his elders by using their native tongue while soliciting their
consultation. In addition, his co−workers may have lacked sufficient
ability to speak and understand English and therefore, would not know
the specifics of the Caucasian workers’ request. Perhaps another reason
was that the request was rather unusual―probably his first time to
deal with this― as protocol called for signature approval.
On the other hand, there was clearly a sense of distrust in the
minds of Jarrett and his cohorts. Impatiently awaiting an answer from
the young employee, what they heard come out of his mouth was utterly
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unintelligible, presumably a “secret language” directed toward his fellow
internees. (From the account , there were apparently no further ex-
changes made between the two interlocutors.) Perturbed by his behav-
ior, Jarrett expected some sort of explanation―at best, a clarification of
what was said in Japanese―but there was none; the matter seemed to
have been totally ignored. The perceived threat was that the internees
were being secretive about how they should deal with their requests.
Jarrett even went further and assumed that the young man was con-
spiring to thwart their demand for the trucks.
From the young man’s standpoint the verbal exchanges seemed
rather innocuous; however, speaking in Japanese in the presence of non
−speakers without translation was a serious blunder under the circum-
stances. While there were no restrictions against speaking Japanese in
“ordinary” circumstances around the camp, language interpretation was
necessary in organized camp meetings among English−speaking repre-
sentatives, as a matter of policy. One could argue that the exchange at
the motor pool bore little or no semblance to an organized meeting,
since this was not a formal gathering and therefore language assistance
was not required. The prevailing attitude, however, was that English
had to be spoken in meetings, for Japanese would arouse suspicion,
(Okihiro 111) which it certainly did. History seems to have repeated it-
self when a young Nikkei,
“heard that American Indians were beaten if they spoke their own
language to each other at school . That is how much hakujin
[whites] looked down on any other language...” (Takezawa 69).
Here lies the crux of the problem: Communication is assumed when
information is shared by opposite parties and the exchange of informa-
tion is meant to be understood. Yet communication was never com-
pleted ; rather , communication was suspended when the young man
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sought consultation from his colleagues. However, there appears to have
been no conclusion after the request was made, which obviously infuri-
ated the administration staff. In addition, on Oct. 31, four days prior,
the evacuee employees at the motor pool were given orders to service
the trucks and they refused (Thomas, Nishimoto 130). It is thus reason-
able to assume that this and the Oct. 31 event led Jarrett to accuse the
young man at the motor pool of purposely withholding the trucks from
them, since this had happened once before.
Why was Jarrett in need of the trucks in the first place? When Pro-
ject Director Best terminated the jobs of the 800 Tule Lake farmers, he
had already conceived of a plan to replace them with “loyal” internees
from Poston and Topaz Relocation Center. They were to seek quarters
some distance from the Tule Lake Segregation Center, and be provided
with food and supplies from the Center. When word spread that trucks
driven by Caucasian employees were used to supply precious Tule Lake
residents’ food and supplies to the “strike breakers”, their anger was
clearly evident. On Nov. 4, there rose a rebellion to prevent the trucks
from loading and transporting food; when the fracas broke out , the
Chief of Internal Security alerted the military immediately and soon
tank and armored trucks entered the compound and took over the ad-
ministration of the camp. Peace was restored but at a price: martial law
was declared, curfew (Collins 47) restricted residents to their barracks,
meetings and gatherings were not permitted without approval, and―
worst of all―with the exception of essential employees, most internees
were without work.
Result
The Nov. 4 incident at the Motor Pool resulted in the questioning of
the young man and his subsequent incarceration in a prison known as
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the “stockade”. He was imprisoned there until Nov. 28 without knowl-
edge of the charges on which he had been arrested. Would there have
been a forced arrest if the young motor pool internee had followed proto-
col, or if the Japanese conversation had been translated and explained
to Jarrett? Within the context of the segregation camp environment―
the heightened tension between the camp administration and the ever−
growing disenchantment of the internees caused by the termination of
jobs , the project director’s unsympathetic stance toward internee re-
quests (augmented by the friction between Japan sympathizers and the
“fence sitters” who opposed the extremists and their activities), the mili-
tary intervention of the camp, and the secret arrests of both agitators
and pacifists (such as the young man) to the stockade―it would have
been highly unlikely for anyone in those circumstances to have avoided
imprisonment.
The administrative authorities’ intent was to detain the perceived
troublemakers by whatever method possible. In addition to the arrest of
Motor Pool employees, internees who were at the site to prevent the
WRA Caucasian from “stealing food from the Internee Food Warehouse”
were interrogated, physically beaten and thrown into the stockade (Civil
Liberties... 210, Weglyn, 212).
“During his interrogation, Mr. Kobayashi was hit on the head with
such force that blood gushed out and the baseball bat actually broke
in two.” (Civil Liberties... 210)
Jarrett saw the young man’s refusal to authorize the vehicles as a
sign of resistance and, further, his speaking Japanese represented the
embodiment of the enemy, a “proof of disloyalty” (Wiley 220−221) and
thus an added motivation to arrest him. The administrator was cogni-
zant of the frequency of Japanese military−style exercises, the chanting
of slogans in the mornings, and the rapid establishments of Japanese
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schools, and could have seen these activities as a threat to his well−be-
ing, his staff and, therefore, to America. A typical reaction to the rallies
follows:
“Their anger was typically American, but was expressed in Japa-
nese symbols, which was an effective form of revenge against the
government” (Girdner, Loftis 319).
Leighton contends that individuals experience fear and panic which
are often symptomatic in “expressions of aggression” when exposed to
hostile crowds. Leighton goes on to illustrate that “when two people are
seen talking together they are instantly assumed to be plotting” (268).
Jarrett was suspicious of precisely the same conditions, Japanese spo-
ken by two members of the motor pool. His subsequent arrest of the
young man illustrates his aggressive reaction.
Anything characteristically Japanese was broadly viewed as an act
of defiance, whether it was involvement in cultural orientation meet-
ings, or attendance at Japanese schools, or celebrating the Emperor’s
birthday, to further extremes like shouting military slogans and re-
nouncing their American citizenship. While Tule Lake administration
did exhibit tolerance in the case of those seeking Japanese instruction
and cultural training, mainly as justification for those “disloyal” intern-
ees hoping to repatriate or expatriate to Japan, face−to−face encounters
between administration representatives and resident internees over pol-
icy matters were mostly fractious.
The Nov. 4 incident and subsequent underground activities resulted
in over two hundred internees being arrested and held captive in the
stockade (Collins 48). Best continued to make arrests thereafter . By
January 1944, the number of detainees had increased to 352 men (Gird-
ner, Loftis 322). The stockade became a symbolic reminder of each and
every resident’s plight, a reflection of their sorry existence under the
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heel of a repressive state with their hopes of freedom diminishing day
by day.
With many of the internee leaders detained in the stockade, the ad-
ministration was faced with no group to represent on the internees’ be-
half. Even at the project director’s request, the Tulean internees refused
to put themselves at risk, as their lives would be at stake if they estab-
lished an elective group. Afraid of being perceived as collaborators―
that is, in the service of the administration―the residents at−large re-
mained rudderless. The strong−arm tactics grew progressively violent as
a number of men were targeted and beaten for their outspoken beliefs
until finally, in July of 1944, the general manager of the despised Coop-
erative Enterprise was murdered (Collins 65−67). This reign of terror by
internee extremists brought any hint of cooperation between adminis-
trative staff and internees to a standstill. This led to the entire internee
police force and other organizations suspected of collaboration being dis-
banded soon thereafter (Collins 68−69).
The combination of their anger towards the administration and the
gross injustice against their fellow detainees fueled the pro−Japan sup-
porters’ desire to push even harder for repatriation. Their daily objective
was to press the “moderates” to commit to national loyalties by endors-
ing Japanese events and joining radical groups such as the Sokuji Kik-
oku Hoshidan who preached for the renunciation of U. S. citizenship
(Spicer, Hansen, Luomala, Opler 240). According to tenBroek, Barnhart,
and Matson, from Tule Lake, 4,406 residents left for Japan (180).
Ironically, many who journeyed back to Japan would discover first
hand a new predicament: that their living situation in post−war Japan
would be far worse than they had ever imagined. Upon arrival, the Issei
generation were shocked to see their homeland in economic and social
upheaval. Family members, relatives and friends were either dispersed,
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dead, or languishing. For the Nisei who had never set foot in the coun-
try of their parents, adaptation and survival served as a daily test of
their endurance and fortitude. Even the Kibei would never have the op-
portunity to relive their childhood memories. Without financial, politi-
cal, and employment backing from the American government, the re-
nunciants―no longer American citizens―were on their own to make
something out of their existence.
Conclusion
The Project Director, Raymond Best, was emblematic of the “asym-
metry” of power which he maintained throughout his tenure at Tule
Lake Segregation Center. He held power over every aspect of the cen-
ter’s matters and as a result, under his control, Tule Lake residents had
to endure extremely stressful conditions. Without question, Best abused
his authority to suppress any form of self−government representation,
showed utter disregard for residents’ sufferings and grievances, termi-
nated internees’ work, arrested and held captive randomly−chosen activ-
ists and leaders of unsanctioned committees, tortured trouble−makers,
denied any personal wrong doings, and worst of all, escaped any retribu-
tion for injustice. The director, in addition, even made “enemies” among
members of his own administration by abusing his authority to dismiss
opposition within his ranks.
The repercussions were obvious : marginalized Tulean residents
faced violent threats by pro−Japan extremists and random acts of vio-
lence by the U. S. military, who victimized not only the agitators but
also the uninvolved internees. Due to the threatening atmosphere of
mass rallies, administration employees resigned. Work stoppages tran-
spired in protest of the lack of safety concerns. An internee worker was
shot dead for no justifiable reason by a military guardsman.
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Against this tense backdrop, at a motor pool facility on Nov. 4, an
agitated group of Caucasian men, one of them the assistant director of
the center, confronted a jittery teenager, and they demanded the use of
the trucks for the unpopular strikebreakers. In a highly charged ex-
change their request was denied, at which time the young man turned
to his colleague and uttered a few fateful words which would serve as
justification for his incarceration in the stockade.
The display of linguistic dominance on the night of Nov. 4 was
clearly audacious, because, from an institutional standpoint, no policy
was in place to prohibit Japanese from being spoken. Yet the move to
place the innocent man under arrest solely on the basis of language was
highly abhorrent because it left no doubt that the project director and
his administration abused their authority.
One might say that the perfect manifestation of power was the
stockade, “a prison within a prison” . Though Tulean residents were
gravely aware of the guard house and its unlawful function, the exis-
tence of the stockade was not made known to the general public. In fact,
when the National Director of the WRA Dillon Meyer explained, in his
book Uprooted Americans , about “the Tule Lake Incident”, he neglected
to mention the incarceration of evacuees in the stockade (Meyer 316).
Weglyn stated it best:
“Tule Lake was an object lesson on how the easy availability of
power corrupts men who wield it― of righteousness sinking to ruth-
lessness as ordinarily decent men harnessed themselves with near−
sadistic zeal to the trappings and techniques of tyranny, relieved of
any sense of personal accountability by their patriotic commitment
to what was clearly national policy: an inflamed chauvinism that
fed on hatred and contempt for things Japanese.” (212)
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